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ON THE CAPACITY OF THE ROBERTS COURT
TO GENERATE CONSEQUENTIAL
PRECEDENT*
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Will the Roberts Court produce decisions of consequence in the
foreseeable future? Or will its contributions be more modest?
We address these questions not by reviewing the doctrine
developed by the Court but rather by considering its capacity to
generate important precedents.
That consideration centers on an account we have previously
called "ideological diversity." To state it simply, the idea is that
the greater the ideological homogeneity of the majority coalition,
the higher the likelihood that it will produce a consequential,
perhaps landmark, decision. As such, the account stands in
marked contrast to more common approaches in the legal
academy that see the nature of judicial rulings as a choice the
Justices consciously make regarding whether to be "minimal" or
not. To us, most Justices-including most on the Roberts
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Court-seek to generate decisions that advance their preferred
view of the law. But their ability to do so is structured in no
small part by the preferences of their colleagues in the majority
coalition.
In what follows, we explain our account and then move to
several empirical tests of it. Finding that data drawn from the
1953 through 2004 Terms support the idea that ideologically
close majorities are more able to produce consequential
decisions, we turn to the Roberts Court. In a nutshell, our
analysis suggests that when five of its members coalesce-as they
are prone to do-the Roberts Court bears the hallmarks of an
institution capable of producing dramatic decisions. On the
other hand, unanimous decisions-also hardly rare events on
this Court-are far less likely to generate consequential
precedent.
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It is not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so
much.
-Justice Stephen Breyer, speaking on the final
day of the 2006 Term'
INTRODUCrION
To some commentators, Justice Breyer's words, while
provocative, overstate the case. Writing about the decisions that
prompted Breyer's remark-the school assignment cases-Mark
Tushnet declares, "[a]s law, Justice Kennedy's opinion is, or can fairly
be read to be, quite narrow.,2 Speaking of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,3
the 2006 Term case on antitrust conspiracies, Einer Elhauge suggests
that "it is quite insignificant, notwithstanding the view of [some
bloggers] that it 'will almost certainly be the most practically
significant case of this term.' "' More generally, Michael Dorf asserts
that the swing Justice on the Court, Anthony Kennedy, is
"temperamentally in tune with [a] more modest approach."5
To other commentators, Justice Breyer's claim was neither
controversial nor provocative; it was the truth. According to the
editors of the San Francisco Chronicle, "[t]he Supreme Court has
taken an undeniable turn to the right under Roberts and Alito, which
could well become one of the enduring legacies of President Bush's
tenure."6 To the veteran Supreme Court reporter Linda Greenhouse,
"[ilt was the Supreme Court that conservatives had long yearned for
and that liberals feared."7 And to Professor Richard Fallon, "[t]he
1. Justice Breyer included this comment in his oral but not written dissent in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2738
(2007). Interested readers can listen to Justice Breyer's oral opinion announcement at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006 05_908/opinion/. Justice Breyer's quote
occurs at 0:32:53.
2. Posting of Mark Tushnet to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/07/
reading-school-integration-cases-like.html (July 4, 2007, 11:09 EST) (emphasis added).
3. 550 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
4. Posting of Einer Elhauge to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://www.volokh.com/
posts/1179785703.shtml (May 21, 2007, 18:15 EST) (emphasis added) (alteration in
original) (quoting Baseball Crank, http://baseballcrank.com/archives2/law-2006/ (May 21,
2007, 11:02 EST)).
5. Morning Edition: The Roberts Court and the Role of Precedent (National Public
Radio broadcast July 3, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyld=11688820.
6. Editorial, Supreme Court's Unsettling Turn, S.F. CHRON., July 5, 2007, at B4.
7. Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2007, at Al. Greenhouse continued, "[b]y the time the Roberts court
ended its first full term on Thursday, the picture was clear. This was a more conservative
court, sometimes muscularly so, sometimes more tentatively, its majority sometimes
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fact that the Roberts Court could do so much in its first term makes it
more likely that it will continue this way. "8
Has Professor Fallon got it right? Will this Court go on to
generate consequential law in the foreseeable future? Or will its
contributions be more modest, as Professor Dorf suggests? We
address these questions not by reviewing doctrine produced by the
Roberts Court, but rather by considering its capacity to generate
important precedent.
That consideration centers on an account we previously have
called "ideological diversity."9 To state it simply, the idea is that the
greater the ideological homogeneity of the majority coalition, the
higher the likelihood that it will produce a consequential, perhaps
landmark, decision. As such, this account stands in marked contrast
to more common approaches in the legal academy that see the nature
of judicial rulings as a choice the Justices consciously make regarding
whether to be "minimal" or not, to formulate a "rule" or
"standard.""0  In our view, most Justices-including most on the
Roberts Court-seek to generate precedents of consequence that
advance their preferred view of the law. But their ability to do so is
structured in no small part by the preferences of their colleagues in
the majority coalition.
We begin with an explanation of our account and then move to
several empirical tests (Parts I and II, respectively). Finding that data
drawn from the 1953 through 2004 Terms support the idea that
ideologically close majorities are more able to produce consequential
decisions, we turn in Part III to the Roberts Court. In a nutshell, our
differing on methodology but agreeing on the outcome in cases big and small." Id. Nina
Totenberg, another veteran reporter, agreed:
For decades conservatives have yearned for control of the U.S. Supreme Court....
For decades, they have been frustrated in achieving that goal, despite having as
many as seven Republican appointees on the court. This term, though,
conservatives seem to have reached the promised land. With new Chief Justice
John Roberts at the helm and Justice Samuel Alito replacing [J]ustice Sandra Day
O'Connor, the direction of the court for this term, at least, has been transformed.
Morning Edition: The Roberts Court and the Role of Precedent, supra note 5.
8. Joan Biskupic, Roberts Steers Court Right Back to Reagan, USA TODAY, June 29,
2007, at 8A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-06-28-supreme-
court-rightN.htm.
9. Nancy Staudt, Barry Friedman & Lee Epstein, On the Role of Ideological
Homogeneity in Generating Consequential Constitutional Decisions, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
361 (2008).
10. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT (1999); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
1302 [Vol. 86
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analysis suggests that both Professors Fallon and Dorf offer plausible
predictions. When five of its members coalesce-as they are so
uniquely prone to do-the Roberts Court bears the hallmark of an
institution capable of producing dramatic decisions. On the other
hand, unanimous decisions-oddly enough, hardly rare events on the
Court despite the ideological heterogeneity of its members-are far
less likely to generate consequential precedent.
I. THEORIZING ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
IDEOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND CONSEQUENTIAL PRECEDENT
Our primary purpose in this Article is to illuminate the Roberts
Court's capacity to generate decisions of consequence. To do so, we
hypothesize that one distinct dimension of the institutional context
should be highly correlated with Supreme Court decisions of note:
the ideological makeup of the majority coalition. 1
We begin, in Part I.A, by briefly explaining what we mean by
decisions of consequence. In Part I.B, we sketch out our central
argument and provide some justification for it. In Part II, we supply
empirical support for the account.
Because we have advanced and explained this argument
elsewhere," we do not use the words "succinctly," "briefly," and
"sketch" by accident. Our point here is not to retread old ground but
rather to provide readers with enough information about our claims
so that they can evaluate their application to the Roberts Court.
A. Defining Decisions of Consequence
In our account, ideological homogeneity is more likely than
ideological diversity to produce "consequential," "noteworthy,"
"important," or "path-breaking" precedent, but what do we mean by
these terms? Because decisions generating important precedent can
come in various forms, no single answer to this question likely will
suffice. 3
To some commentators, ourselves included, the precedent
established in a decision may be consequential if it clearly and
effectively breaks new legal ground. For example, Mapp v. Ohio4
11. We focus on the ideological makeup of the majority primarily, but not exclusively.
We consider other factors infra Part III.
12. See Staudt, Friedman & Epstein, supra note 9.
13. We draw the discussion in this Part from Staudt, Friedman & Epstein, supra note
9.
14. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2008] 1303
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required state courts to apply the exclusionary rule upon finding the
government violated the Fourth Amendment.15 This ruling was crisp
and tidal in its impact. Although one might have supposed imposing
the exclusionary rule ought not matter much-after all, none of the
states were claiming an entitlement to ignore the Fourth
Amendment-the strong negative reaction of officials indicated
Mapp would require a great change in their practices. 16 The same was
true of Engel v. Vitale, 7 prohibiting prayer in schools.18 "For several
days," reported Anthony Lewis in the New York Times, "all the
serious business of the Congress of the United States was put aside
while members spent their time denouncing the Supreme Court."' 9
Even if a decision does not make clear, new law, however, it can
still be noteworthy if it signals a major change in the Court's
direction. Reed v. Reed2 ° stands as an example here. Reed was the
first case in which the Supreme Court struck down a distinction based
on sex as unconstitutional.1 It established little in the way of a new
rule; the Court seemed only to apply rational basis scrutiny in
deciding the case. Yet, no one watching could doubt that a shift had
occurred. As Gerald Gunther said in reaction, "[i]t is difficult to
understand [the Reed] result without an assumption that some special
sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor entered into the analysis.
22
One particular kind of change in direction may be even more
noteworthy: the overruling case. By their very nature, overruling
cases often will establish a clear rule (the opposite of the pre-existing
rule). 3 Yet, even when they are less clear about the precise legal
15. Id. at 655.
16. Criminal procedure expert Professor Yale Kamisar said that to listen to the
reaction of the police "[y]ou would have thought we had just passed the Fourth
Amendment at a constitutional convention." Yale Kamisar, When Wasn't There a "Crime
Crisis"?, 39 F.R.D. 450, 459 (1965). Kamisar quoted New York's Deputy Police
Commissioner, who said the case "was a shock to us. We had to reorganize our thinking,
frankly. Before this, nobody bothered to take out search warrants." Id. at 458.
17. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
18. Id. at 424.
19. Anthony Lewis, Court Again Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1962, at 10E.
20. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
21. See id. at 77.
22. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1972).
23. Thus, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), measures up under two criteria.
It established a clear rule that felony defendants facing jail time were entitled to have
lawyers provided if they were indigent. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45. And Gideon scores
again as an overruling case: the majority overturned (and without much sympathy) the
prior "special circumstances" rule of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Id.
1304 [Vol. 86
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rule, they may still signal an important change of direction. In Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,24 the Supreme Court
clearly overruled National League of Cities v. Usery. What precisely
Garcia portended was a matter of some doubt, as the Court's later
federalism cases made quite clear.26 Still, it was well understood at
the time that an important shift had occurred.27
Some cases are important because of what they do as much as for
what they say. A Supreme Court decision overturning an act of
Congress is almost always consequential. Of course, there are some
laws that were so trivial, or that were invalidated in such trivial
respects, that perhaps the law actually changes little.28 Still, most of
the time when a congressional law is overturned, the impact is of
importance. The Justices at least state rhetorically that they think
long and hard before overturning congressional enactments, and
these are relatively rare events.
B. Explaining the Relationship Between Ideological Homogeneity
and Consequential Precedent
If we suppose that the foregoing is a fair, if incomplete,
representation of decisions generating precedent of note, how do they
come about? That is, assuming that the Justices in the majority can
transform any dispute into a major (or minor!) ruling, what explains
their choice? Several possibilities present themselves, but we stress
the effect of ideological diversity on the nature of the decision the
Justices render. On this account, the greater the homogeneity of the
majority, the higher the likelihood of a consequential decision.
24. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
25. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
27. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Enhance Federal Powers over the State, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1985, at Al ("Taking the rare step of overruling one of its own recent
precedents, the Supreme Court today significantly enhanced the power of the Federal
Government to regulate state activities that had been considered immune from Federal
control."); Al Kamen, Court Widens Hill's Power, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1985, at Al ("A
divided Supreme Court yesterday reversed itself on a major states' rights issue and ruled 5
to 4 that Congress has broad power to impose its will on state and local governments, even
in areas that traditionally have been left to their discretion.").
28. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 169 (8th ed. 2004) (arguing "many
of the Court's decisions declaring statutes unconstitutional have been unimportant to the
policy goals of Congress and the [P]resident"). An example might be Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893), in which the Court struck down a law
concerning the amount of money the United States would pay to companies for the
purchase of a lock and dam in the Monongahela river. Id. at 344-45.
2008] 1305
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To some scholars, this idea may seem counterintuitive or even
just plain wrong. Students of constitutional law, for example, will be
quick to point to cases such as Wickard v. Filburn,29 Reed v. Reed, 0
United States v. Nixon," and, of course, Brown v. Board of
Education"-all of which were consequential under any definition
and all of which were produced by unanimous, seemingly
ideologically diverse Courts.33 More generally, these same scholars
might contend that it is when the Court speaks in one voice that it
best is able to generate consequential precedent. 34
Unless all sitting Justices have preferences that rest on the same
(or nearly the same) ideal point in policy space-a null set, by the
way-the contention that the Supreme Court does most when it
speaks with one voice defies logic. To see why, consider Figure 1,
which depicts ideological estimates for the 2006 Term Court, 5 and
think about the task confronting a Justice, any Justice, hoping to
produce a unanimous opinion. Even if all nine agree on the
disposition, she must draft an opinion that accommodates colleagues
as diverse as Stevens and Thomas. In many instances, this will be a
near-heroic quest given the laundry list of issues over which the
Justices can divide-including, but certainly not limited to, overruling
29. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
30. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
31. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
32. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. On our account, the ability to generate consequential precedent is less about size
than about ideological homogeneity, though the two can certainly be related. We return
to this point infra Part III.
34. If not consequential, such precedent is at least efficacious. See, e.g., BRADLEY C.
CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT
168-69 (2d ed. 1999) (arguing that unanimous decisions tend to create "final, clear, and
persuasive policy"); Lawrence Baum, Implementation of Judicial Decisions: An
Organizational Analysis, 4 AM. POL. Q. 86, 92 (1976) (contending that clear majority
decisions lead to more effective policy implementation); John F. Davis & William L.
Reynolds, Judicial Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59,
62 (stating that clear majority opinions carry more precedential weight).
35. See infra Figure 1. More specifically, these are Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M.
Quinn's ideal point estimates. Martin and Quinn derive them from the votes cast by the
Justices and via a Bayesian modeling strategy. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn,
Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme
Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 134-52 (2002) (employing "Markov Chain
Monte Carlo methods to fit a Bayesian model of ideal points for all Justices serving on the
U.S. Supreme Court from 1953 through 1999"). The updated Martin and Quinn ideal




or distinguishing a prior precedent, as the 2006 Term all too well
indicated.36
Then again, even if the opinion writer were able to pull it off and
unite the Court, would the resulting decision produce as
consequential a ruling as, say, an opinion that accommodated the
(typically smallest number of) Justices closest in ideological space?
Chief Justice Roberts thinks not. His often-stated goal of bringing
greater consensus to the Court rests on the belief that "[t]he broader
the agreement among the Justices, the more likely it is a decision on
the narrowest possible grounds."37
IH
Stevens BreyerSouter Kennedy Alito Scalia Thomas
Ginsburg Roberts
Figure 1: Martin-Quinn ideal point estimates for the 2006 Term
Court. The further to the left, the more liberal the estimate.
The estimates range from -2.57 for Stevens to 4.29 for
Thomas.38
We agree that the greater the number of Justices in the majority,
the narrower the decision will be. Our conclusion is consistent with
countless analyses of group decisionmaking in many different
contexts. Social scientists now conclude that dispersion of ideological
preferences among the members of winning coalitions will lead to
greater levels of conflict than when members are all located on or
near the same point in a policy space.39 It is this very conflict among
36. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 557 U.S -,... 127 S. Ct. 2553,
2671-72 (2007) (debating how the Court should treat the doctrine of stare decisis). For
other examples of the issues over which members of the majority negotiate, see generally
LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
37. Editorial, Chief Justice Says His Goal Is More Consensus on Court, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 2006, at A16.
38. For more details, see supra note 35.
39. Social scientists have found that important and noteworthy laws are far more
likely to emerge when the same political party controls both Congress and the executive
branch; a divided government, in contrast, impairs the lawmakers' ability to enact
consequential law. See James J. Coleman, Unified Government, Divided Government, and
Party Responsiveness, 93 AM. REV. POL. SCI. 821, 826-28 (1999); Sean Q. Kelly, Divided
We Govern: A Reassessment, 25 POLITY 475, 477 (arguing that "divided government does
have a significant impact on the emergence of innovative policy"). But see Keith Krehbiel,
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members of the Court-specifically among members of the majority
coalition-we argue, that ultimately impedes the production of a
consequential decision.4 °
II. TESTING THE "IDEOLOGICAL DIVERSITY" ACCOUNT OF
CONSEQUENTIAL PRECEDENT
While empirical studies have validated the idea that bodies as
diverse as Congress, unions, and corporations, among others, are
more effective when they are homogeneous,4' scholars of the Court
have yet to put it to the test. Accordingly, we ask whether this
account of ideological diversity holds for the Justices. That is, do
majority coalitions with homogenous preferences produce a different
kind of opinion than majorities with ideologically dispersed
preferences?
In what follows, we explain how we addressed this question
empirically in previous work42; we also provide a taste of our initial
Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified
Government, 8 J. THEORETICAL POL. 7, 36 (1996) (theorizing that unified governments
should be no more effective than divided governments). Within the House and Senate
chambers individually, scholars also have found that when the majority party becomes
more homogenous, it becomes both more powerful and better able to achieve its policy
ambitions. See David Brody, Richard Brody & David Epstein, Heterogeneous Parties and
Political Organization: The U.S. Senate, 1880-1920, 14 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 205,218-21 (1989)
(noting that homogenous parties are able to appoint powerful and effective committee
leaders).
These findings about group effectiveness are, we hasten to note, quite robust and
replicated in many different contexts, including those outside the government sector.
Scholars interested in decisionmaking in the private firm environment, for example, have
found that management teams tend to be quite a bit more successful when they consist of
like-minded thinkers than when they are populated by individuals with diverse
preferences. See Martin Kilduff, Rienhard Angelmar & Ajay Mehra, Top Management-
Team Diversity and Firm Performance: Examining the Role of Cognitions, 11 ORG. SCI.
21, 30 (2000) (finding diversity in top management negatively correlated with market
share increases). Similarly, interest groups, unions, and religious organizations seem to be
more powerful and effective in their missions when they are comprised of individuals with
homogenous preferences. See Brad Christerson & Michael Emerson, The Costs of
Diversity in Religious Organizations: An In-depth Case Study, 64 SOC. OF RELIGION 163,
165 (2003) (noting that theorists contend that the most successful religious organizations
cater to homogeneous groups); Rebecca S. Demsetz, Voting Behavior in Union
Representation Elections: The Influence of Skill Homogeneity and Skill Group Size, 47
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 99, 112 (1993) (concluding that homogeneous labor unions are
more readily organized than heterogeneous groups).
40. See generally Staudt, Friedman & Epstein, supra note 9. For example, we deal
with the question of why the median voter theory does not undercut our account that
ideological heterogeneity leads to less consequential decisions. Id. at 3-4. The answer, in
short, lies in the ability of each Justice to write separately. Id.
41. See supra note 39.
42. Staudt, Friedman & Epstein, supra note 9.
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findings. Part II.B presents the results of a fresh, more expansive test.
Both sets of results support the idea that the less diverse the majority,
the higher the likelihood of producing consequential law.
A. A Previous and Initial Test
In an earlier study, we assessed the ideological diversity account
for a limited set of decisions-those handed down between the 1953
and 2004 Terms implicating questions of state or federal
constitutional law.43 Conducting that analysis required us to develop
a measure of (1) the dependent variable-whether a constitutional
law decision is consequential or not-and of (2) the key causal
variable-the ideological diversity of the majority coalition. Finally,
because ideological diversity is surely not the only factor that
contributes to the production of consequential precedent, we (3)
theorized about (and measured) additional covariates.
As to the first, we relied on what is surely a reliable and efficient
and (we believe) valid proxy for consequential decisions: those
reported on the front page of the New York Times on the day after
the Justices handed down their decision (hereinafter the "NYT
measure").' David Mayhew introduced this approach in his now-
famous 1991 book, Divided We Govern,45 which investigated
important legislation emerging from Congress during periods of
divided government. Since then, countless legislative scholars also
have used this measure, and Epstein and Segal found it to be
appropriate for identifying salient Supreme Court cases. 6 For our
purposes, it stands to reason that if the Supreme Court issues an
opinion of consequence, a newspaper of record like the Times will
cover it. Roe v. Wade47 provides an example. As history has born
out, Roe was an important case. Yet, on the day that the Court
handed it down Lyndon Johnson died, Henry Kissinger arrived in
Paris for the last round of the Vietnam peace talks, and GM recalled
thirty-seven million cars. Nonetheless, Roe still made it to the front
page of the Times. More generally, while a small fraction of cases
might have made it onto Epstein and Segal's list because they were
newsworthy, and not noteworthy, we challenge scholars to identify
43. Id.
44. See infra note 58 (describing this variable and all others in the analysis).
45. DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN 9 (2d ed. 2005).
46. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. ScI. 66,
72-81 (2000).
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1971).
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many other important, consequential, or cutting-edge cases that the
Times failed to report on its front page.48
Moving to the second task, measuring the primary independent
variable-ideological homogeneity or, if you prefer, heterogeneity-
political scientists have offered a number of creative approaches.49
For our purposes, though, the Martin-Quinn ideal point estimates are
nearly ideal.50 Martin and Quinn derive their point estimates from
the votes cast by each Justice using a Bayesian modeling strategy.
They are dynamic, valid, reliable, and, last but not least, available for
each Term and Justice in our study.51
With the Martin-Quinn ideal point estimates in hand, we turned
to Harold J. Spaeth's U.S. Supreme Court Database to identify the
members of the majority vote coalition in each constitutional case
decided between the 1953 and 2005 Terms.52 To each member we
48. There are, of course, potential problems and criticisms of this approach. Because
we address many in our previous work, see Staudt, Friedman & Epstein, supra note 9,
suffice it to note here that the NYT measure has several advantages over other possible
measures. Primarily, it is reliable, capable of updating (and backdating), and not biased in
favor of liberal or conservative decisions or particular types of cases. Epstein and Segal
demonstrate as much, subjecting the NYT measure to a battery of tests to assess biases
and cross-validating it. Epstein & Segal, supra note 46, at 73-77. The measure performs
well on all their tests. Epstein and Segal demonstrate that the "percentage of liberal
decisions (58.2) covered on the front page of the Times roughly matches the overall figure
of 52.2 percent." See id. at 76. For a discussion of the approach from a critical perspective
in the context of the legislative activity, see Sean Kelly, Divided We Govern: A
Reassessment, 25 POLITY 475, 477-78 (1993).
49. For a discussion of various other measurers, see Martin & Quinn, supra note 35, at
136-37 (general discussion of approaches to estimating ideal points); and Nancy Staudt,
Lee Epstein & Peter Wiedenbeck, The Ideological Component of Judging in the Taxation
Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797, 1800-12 (2006) (describing three methods used to
determine the political preferences of Justices).
50. Martin & Quinn, supra note 35, at 137-52; see, e.g., supra Figure 1. Their updated
ideal point estimates, along with all other data used in this study, are available at
http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/RobertsCt.html.
51. Despite their relative youth, the Martin-Quinn scores have received a good deal of
play in the law reviews. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey, Electing the
Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123, 134-39 (2003); Andrew D. Martin, Kevin Quinn & Lee
Epstein, The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275,
1275-317 (2005); Theodore W. Ruger, Justice Harry Blackmun and the Phenomenon of
Judicial Preference Change, 70 MO. L. REV. 1209, 1209 n.1; Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Chief
Justice and the Institutional Judiciary: Strategy and Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion
Assignment, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1754 (2006).
52. The database identifies scores of attributes of all Supreme Court cases decided on
their merits since the 1953 Term. The S. Sidney Ulmer Project, http://www.as.uky.edu/
polisci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). For this initial study, we
relied on the October 2006 version, with analu=0 and decjtype=l or 7. We also studied
only constitutional law decisions (i.e., we selected authdecl/authdec2=1, 2, or 7). Finally,
as our emphasis on vote indicates, we examined majority vote, not opinion, coalitions. For
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attached his or her Martin-Quinn ideal point estimate, and then
computed a simple but powerful measure of homogeneity-the
Martin-Quinn standard deviation of the majority vote coalition in
each case. 3
The final step in the analysis consisted of developing other
factors that may affect the production of consequential decisions. We
focused on three: the number of Justices in the majority, the ideology
of the majority, and the total number of cases decided in the Term.54
The first, the size of the majority, reflects the expectation that the
more Justices who sign on to a majority opinion, the less it is likely to
accomplish. That is because, in line with our earlier discussion,
adding Justices, each presumably with his or her preferences
regarding the decision, may serve to dilute the impact that could be
achieved by a smaller number of sympathetic Justices. Relatedly,
while it does not necessarily follow that larger coalitions are more
heterogeneous, on average it (mostly) holds for the Supreme Court of
the United States.55 The second factor-the ideology of the majority
rather than the dispersion of this ideology-captures the (admittedly
arguable, though nonetheless pervasive) view that majorities
populated with liberals are more likely to render cutting-edge
the more expansive test we offer in Part III, we considered both vote and opinion
coalitions. See also infra Appendix.
53. See infra note 58 (describing this variable and all others in the analysis).
54. Given our measure of the dependent variable and our focus (in the initial analysis)
on constitutional law disputes, we controlled for two other variables: when the Court
alters its own precedent or overturns a law passed by Congress. To incorporate them, we
relied on Spaeth's codings under the variables, alt prec (alteration of precedent) and
uncon (overturn federal law). See supra note 52.
55. For the data we used in Staudt, Friedman & Epstein, supra note 9, the number of
Justices in the majority vote coalition (for coalitions of size five or greater) and the mean
standard deviation of the Martin-Quinn ideal point estimate (our measure of ideological
diversity) are as follows. Note that higher numbers on the ideological diversity measure
indicate greater ideological heterogeneity.







For a graphical depiction of this relationship, see infra Figure 6.
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decisions.56 While it is no doubt the case that conservatives can be as
activist as liberals, it is also true that since 1937 liberal activism has
more frequently taken the form of expanding precedents, and thus
might garner more attention. This particularly is the case given
that-as some have argued-the conservative revolution at times has
been one of "stealth," quietly cutting back on existing rules rather
than doing so overtly. Thus, during the Burger Court, commentators
warned of a "covert counterrevolution."57 Finally, it is possible that
the more cases the Court decides in any given Term, the less able any
given majority is to produce big decisions. Perhaps keeping up with
their docket makes it difficult to devote sustained attention to any
one major project. This may not hold true; however, doing important
things does not necessarily take many words or much time. Still,
given the possibility, we believe it important to consider and control
for the number of majority opinions issued.
In short, for this initial analysis (again, of constitutional law
only), we posited that three variables, in addition to ideological
diversity, are likely to affect the ability of the Court's majority to
produce a consequential decision: its size, its ideology, and the
number of decisions handed down in a given Term.58 We learned that
all four variables exert statistically significant effects. Most
importantly, we found that regardless of the size of the majority, the
more homogeneous the Court, the more likely it is to produce a
56. See, e.g., THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY
1 (2004) ("For decades ... the standard conservative view of the Supreme Court has
amounted to a critique of liberal 'judicial activism.' ").
57. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., An Activism of Ambivalence, 98 HARv. L. REV. 315, 319
(1984) (reviewing THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T
(V. Blasi ed. 1983)).
58. See also supra note 54. A description of the variables in our analysis is as follows
(N=2573).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Consequential Constitutional Law Cases 0.23 0.42 0 1
Ideological Diversity of the Majority 1.85 0.57 0.36 3.99
Number of Justices in the Majority 6.83 1.54 4 9
Ideology of the Majority 0.15 0.97 -2.25 2.01
Number of Cases 115.15 24.98 65 151
Overturn Precedent 0.04 0.19 0 1
Overturn Federal Law 0.03 0.16 0 1
Note that for this initial analysis, for Ideological Diversity of the Majority and Number of




consequential decision. With all other variables held at their mean
(or mode), including the Number of Justices in the Majority, the
probability of an extremely heterogeneous majority generating a
noteworthy decision is just .0959; that figure increases to .336 if the
majority is extremely homogeneous. The size of the majority, though,
is hardly substantively irrelevant. All else being equal, a minimum-
winning vote (e.g. five-to-four) will produce a consequential decision
in about one out of every four cases.61  At the highest levels of
homogeneity, that figure increases to forty percent.62 For unanimous
majorities, conversely, the predicted probability of generating an
important decision never exceeds .26 even when they are highly
homogeneous; 63 the odds drop as low as .07 when they are highly
heterogeneous.64
B. A New, More Expansive Analysis
The takeaway from these preliminary results is impossible to
escape: it is the homogeneous, five-person coalition and not the
unanimous Court that is more likely to generate consequential
precedent-consequential constitutional precedent, that is. Recall
that the tests described above rested exclusively on an analysis of the
Court's 2,573 constitutional law decisions-or, less than half the
Court's plenary docket.
For purposes of analyzing the Roberts Court's institutional
capacity to generate consequential precedent-whether in the
constitutional realm or beyond-we now expand our analysis to
include all 5,610 cases decided following oral argument with a signed
opinion and handed down since the 1953 Term but before Justice
Alito joined the Court.65 All other variables remain as we defined
them above.66
59. The 95% confidence interval is [.06, .15].
60. The 95% confidence interval is [.26, .411.
61. .26 with a 95% confidence interval of [.23, .29].
62. The 95% confidence interval is [.33, .47].
63. The 95% confidence interval is [.18, .36].
64. The 95% confidence interval is [.04, .10].
65. That is, we exclude cases after O'Connor's departure. We reserve post-O'Connor
cases for the analysis in Part IV.
66. Because our emphasis is no longer exclusively on constitutional law, we omit a
variable indicating whether the Court overturned a federal law. We also exclude the
variable on the alteration of precedent because seventy-five percent of those alterations
came in constitutional cases. For more details on these variables, see supra note 58. It is
worth noting, though, that inclusion of one or both variables changes neither the statistical
results nor our substantive interpretation of them.
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Further, we now consider two different approaches to assessing
the members of the majority coalition. For the initial analysis
reported in Part III.A, we studied only the composition of the vote
coalition (that is, all members of the majority who vote with the
majority) out of belief that the opinion writer must contend with each
member. An alternative is to focus on the members of the majority
opinion coalition (i.e., those who vote with the majority and do not
concur separately). For this more expansive test, we consider both
the composition of the vote coalition and the members of the
majority opinion coalition.
As it turns out, this is a difference without meaning for our
analysis. As Table 1 and the Appendix show, regardless of whether
we examine the opinion or vote coalition, the estimate of Ideological
Diversity of the Majority remains statistically significant and correctly
signed.67 In other words, and in line with our account and the initial
analysis, higher degrees of ideological homogeneity remain
statistically associated with higher odds of producing a decision of
consequence.
As for those variables we do include, the table below summarizes them (for
majority vote coalitions) (N=5610):
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Ideological Diversity of the Majority 1.92 0.57 0.21 4.13
Number of Justices in the Majority 7.04 1.55 4 9
Ideology of the Majority 0.07 0.89 -2.28 2.02
Number of Cases 112.62 24.33 35 151
Note that the minimum number of cases is 35. This is the number decided in 2005 prior to
Alito's arrival.
67. To keep the discussion manageable, the text focuses on vote coalitions; the
Appendix replicates the analysis for majority opinion coalitions.
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Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Ideological Diversity of the -0.356* (0.078)
Majority -0.212* (0.027)
Number of Justices in the Majority -0.226* (0.046)
Ideology of the Majority -0.002 (0.001)





Table 1: The effect of the ideological diversity of the
majority vote coalition on the creation of a
consequential decision. * p < .05. Standard errors are
robust. For results pertaining to the majority opinion
coalition, see Table 3 in the Appendix.
But how much higher? Do the statistical results-especially
those pertaining to ideological diversity-exert strong substantive
effects on the law?68 To address these questions we consider several
plausible scenarios, with Figure 2 displaying the most relevant for our
project. Figure 2 shows the effect of homogeneity on the probability
of the Court producing salient precedent when we set the size of the
majority at five, seven, and nine persons-in other words, the
(approximate) minimum, mean, and maximum values of Number of
Justices in the Majority.
68. By design, the analyses that follow replicate those appearing in our early work but,
of course, rely on the expanded database. Also, and once again, for purposes of
streamlining the discussion in the text, we focus on the majority vote coalitions rather than
the opinion coalitions. The Appendix houses the results for majority opinion coalitions.
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Ideoloical Diersity (from Most to Least Homogeneous)
Figure 2: The effect of ideological diversity, for three sizes of
the majority vote coalition, on the likelihood of generating
consequential precedent. The panels show the predicted
probability of the Court producing an important decision when
we set the size of the Court's majority at its (approximate)
minimum (five), mean (seven), and maximum (nine) values
over the range of Ideological Diversity (the closer to zero the
more ideologically homogeneous the majority). In all panels,
Ideology of the Majority and Number of Cases are set at their
means. The vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
We generated this figure using SPost.
Focusing first on the ideological diversity account, the conclusion
from Figure 2 is clear: regardless of the size of the majority, the more
homogeneous the majority coalition, the more likely it is to produce a
consequential decision. With all other variables held at their mean,
including the size of the majority, the probability of an extremely
heterogeneous majority generating a noteworthy decision is just .08;6 9
69. The 95% confidence interval is [.05, .10].
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that figure increases to .2570 if the majority is extremely
homogeneous.
The Number of Justices in the Majority, though, and just as we
might suspect, is hardly trivial. All else being equal, a five-to-four
coalition will produce a consequential decision in slightly more than
one out of every five cases.7' When those five Justices are
ideologically closely aligned (i.e., at the highest levels of
homogeneity), that figure increases to thirty-four percent.72 For
unanimous majorities, conversely, the predicted probability of
generating an important decision never exceeds .18 even when they
are highly homogeneous;73 the odds drop as low as .05 when they are
highly heterogeneous.74 So once again, anecdotal evidence aside, the
unanimous Court is far less likely to generate decisions of
consequence than the ideologically homogeneous, five-person
coalition.
Ideology plays yet another role in the production of noteworthy
decisions. In line with the conventional wisdom, it turns out that
liberal majorities are more likely to produce "big" decisions than
their more conservative counterparts. Consider Figure 3, in which we
depict the change in the predicted probability of a consequential
opinion across the range of values of Ideological Diversity for very
liberal, more moderate, and very conservative majority coalitions.
75
Notice that the likelihood of even an extremely homogeneous
conservative majority generating a consequential decision is never
much greater than one in five; for the extremely liberal (and
homogeneous) coalition, it could reach as high as nearly fifty
percent.76
70. The 95% confidence interval is [.20, .30].
71. .22 with a 95% confidence interval of [.20, .24].
72. The 95% confidence interval is [.28, .391.
73. The 95% confidence interval is [.13, .23].
74. The 95% confidence interval is [.03, .071.
75. The other variables are set at their mean or mode.
76. The predicted percent is thirty-six, with a 95% confidence interval of [.27, .45.
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Figure 3: The effect of ideological diversity, by the ideology of
the majority vote coalition, on the likelihood of generating
consequential precedent. The panels show the predicted
probability of the Court producing an important decision when
we set the ideology of the majority coalition at its most liberal,
moderate (average), and most conservative levels over the
range of Ideological Diversity (the closer to zero the more
ideologically homogeneous the majority). In all panels,
Number of Justices in the Majority and Number of Cases are set
at their means. The vertical lines represent 95% confidence
intervals. We generated this figure using SPost.
Then again, it bears repeating that the results in Figure 3 reflect,
as they must, our dataset. Were it to include pre-1937 cases-
specifically, the period of conservative activism during the Lochner
era-or, we might speculate, the post-2006 Term cases, an entirely
different result might have obtained.
Even with this caveat, the analyses presented so far are revealing.
At the least they tell us that the ideological diversity of the majority
matters-and matters a lot-for the production of decisions
generating consequential precedent. Likewise, and perhaps not
surprisingly, so does the majority's size and its ideology.
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III. THE ROBERTS COURT AND MAJORITY COALITIONS
How does the Roberts Court, since Alito joined it,7 measure up
along these three dimensions? At first blush, quite nicely. Of the
eleven decisions of note during this period (shown in Table 2) most
seem in line with our account. Eight were the product of minimum-
winning votes, but more importantly, they were generated by (more
or less) the most ideologically homogeneous coalitions available on
this Court: Kennedy joining the four liberals or four conservatives.78
77. Justice Alito took his judicial oath on January 31, 2006, the same day that Justice
O'Connor's service on the Court terminated. See Members of the Supreme Court of the
United States, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (providing data on
Supreme Court appointments, oaths, and departures from 1789 to present). All previous
analyses end with O'Connor's departure on January 31, 2006. The analyses that follow
begin with her departure.
78. Owing in part to Thomas's extreme conservatism, when Kennedy joins the four
liberals, the majority is more ideologically homogeneous than when he joins the four
conservatives (1.099 versus 1.476).
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Cases
Rapanos v. United States79 (2006)
LULAC v. Perry8 ° (2006)
Gonzales v. Carhart81 (2007)
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire 2 (2007)
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life83 (2007)
Parents v. Seattle School District
84
(2007)
Massachusetts v. EPA8 5 (2007)
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld86 (2006)
Randall v. Sorrel8 7 (2006)
Tellabs v. Makor Issues88 (2007)
Hill v. McDonough8 9 (2006)
Table 2: Decisions of consequence produced by the
Roberts Court since Justice Alito's arrival. These are
cases that appeared on the front page of the New York
Times on the day after the Court handed them down.
But merely glancing at the data cannot reveal the whole story.
Actually, it may be downright misleading. For example, even if the
Roberts Court's coalitions are minimum-winning and ideologically
connected, they may not be especially homogeneous. Indeed, given
the gap between Kennedy and the Justices to his right and left-not
79. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
80. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
81. 550 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
82. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
83. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. , 127 S. Ct. 2652
(2007).
84. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct.
2738 (2007).
85. 549 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
86. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
87. 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
88. Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
89. 547 U.S. 573 (2006).
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Vote
5-4 (Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, Alito in the majority)
5-4 (Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, Alito in the majority)
5-4 (Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, Alito in the majority)
5-4 (Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, Alito in the majority)
5-4 (Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, Alito in the majority)
5-4 (Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, Alito in the majority)
5-4 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
Breyer, Kennedy in the majority)
5-3 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
Breyer, Kennedy in the majority)
6-3 (Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, Breyer, Alito in the
majority)
8-1 (all but Stevens in the majority)
9-0
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to mention Thomas's extremismS---it is possible that even larger
coalitions formed in early eras were more ideologically homogeneous
than the five-person coalitions of the Roberts Court.
Shedding light on the Roberts Court Justices' ability to generate
consequential decisions thus requires a more systematic approach.
We take such an approach below, contemplating how the current
Court compares to its predecessors on the three factors that proved
significant in our statistical model-the ideology of the majority
coalition, its size, and, of course, its diversity.
A. Ideology
Overall, and likely to the surprise of no one, the Roberts Court is
significantly more conservative than the average Court sitting since
the 1953 Term.91 For our analysis, however, the important question is
not the overall ideology of the Court but rather the ideology of those
Justices who form majority coalitions. This reflects our finding that
liberal majorities, even controlling for their size and homogeneity, are
more likely to produce precedent of consequence-at least for the
data we have available here.
By this criterion, the majority vote coalitions on the Roberts
Court remain, on average, more conservative than is typical. While
they do not, as we show in Figure 4, surpass those formed in several
earlier Terms-most notably in 1975 and 1992-they are noticeably
more right-leaning than any since 2000.
90. See supra Figure 1.
91. We base this statement on a t-test (p < .05) comparing the 2006 Term mean of the
Martin-Quinn ideal point estimate of the 2006 Term (.365) with all Terms between 1953
and 2005 (-.048).
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1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Term
Figure 4: The mean ideology of majority coalitions formed
each Term since 1953. The higher the number, the more
conservative the majority.
What does this suggest for the Roberts Court's ability to
generate consequential decisions? Overall, recall that our results in
Figure 3 show a positive association between the liberalism of the
majority coalition and the likelihood of it generating a consequential
decision. With all other variables held at their mean, moving from
extreme levels of liberalism to extreme levels of conservatism reduces
the predicted probability of observing a consequential decision by
about fifty-six percent.92 For the post-Alito Roberts Court, with the
mean level of liberalism of its majority vote coalitions at .59, we
predict that, holding all else at its mean, the average coalition has
about a .14 probability of generating a consequential decision. This is
below average for the entire pre-Alito period but only marginally so. 93
92. From a predicted probability of .24 [.20, .28] to .10 [.09, .12].
93. As we note in the text, the predicted probability of producing a consequential
decision for a Court with a mean level of liberalism of .59 for its majority vote coalitions is
about .14 [.12, .15], with all other variables set at their means. Holding all variables
(including the Ideology of the Majority vote coalition) at their mean yields a predicted
probability of .15 [.14, .16].
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In fact, the decline is so small that it tempers any conclusions we
might reach about the Roberts Court-at least conclusions based
solely on its ideology. Also dampening our enthusiasm for making
predictions are, once again, the data we have available to us-drawn
from the post-Lochner era. Yet a final and even more crucial
cautionary note here is that we base our forecast of .14 on the "on
average" size of the majority coalition. The Roberts Court, however,
is hardly average on this dimension.
B. Size
This brings us to the issue of size. Recall that a smaller majority
is more likely to generate consequential decisions, even after
controlling for its size and ideology. Focusing on the 1953 through
2005 Terms (up until O'Connor's departure), our results suggest that
moving from the smallest majority vote coalition to the largest (a
unanimous vote) leads to a fifty-nine percent decline in the likelihood
of producing a consequential decision.94  Looking at opinion
coalitions shows an even starker difference, from a probability of .4695
for the smallest to .08 for the largest (again, 9).96
If commentary on the Roberts Court were any indication, the
Roberts Court should shine on this dimension. By the conclusion of
the 2006 Term, story after story and blog after blog emphasized the
number of minimum-winning (i.e., five-to-four vote) cases. As
Kermit Roosevelt put it, "With a flurry of 5-to-4 decisions handed
down at the end of June, the Supreme Court served notice that things
are changing at One First Street."97  At the Fox News Sunday
Roundtable, Chris Wallace introduced his summary of the Term with
these words: "In the nineteen five-to-four decisions that broke along
ideological grounds, the conservatives prevailed in thirteen cases."9"
Charles Lane's numbers were different, but the sentiment was the
same:
This term, the Justices split 5 to 4 in 24 cases, a third of the
total. Kennedy sided with the four most conservative Justices-
Roberts, Alito, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas-in 13 of
the 5 to 4 cases, while backing liberals John Paul Stevens, David
94. From 25.64 [22.53, 28.74] to 10.62 [9.31, 11.93]. From a predicted probability of
.24 [.20, .28] to .10 [.09, .12].
95. The 95% confidence interval is [.40, .531.
96. The 95% confidence interval is [.07, .09].
97. Kermit Roosevelt, How To Judge the Roberts Supreme Court, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 6, 2007, at 9.
98. Fox News Sunday (Fox News television broadcast July 1, 2007).
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H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer just six
times. In five other 5 to 4 cases, the court did not split along
liberal-conservative lines."
And yet, the empirical story is more complicated-and more
interesting. On the one hand, we observe no significant difference, on
average, between the size of majority vote coalitions produced by the
Roberts Court and all previous years since 1953.1" The mean number
of Justices in the majority prior to Roberts's arrival is 7.04; after
Alito's arrival it decreased ever so slightly, to 6.97.11
On the other hand, the distributions are quite different, as Figure
5 indicates. Note that in both panels, decisions by five- and nine-
person majorities comprise the largest proportion. But prior to Alito,
they accounted for just about half (.49) of all decisions; since his
arrival, that figure has jumped to over two-thirds (.67). To put it
another way, coalitions of sizes six, seven, and eight were not rare
events in the pre-Alito years, but they are now.
99. Charles Lane, Narrow Victories Move Roberts Court to the Right, WASH. POST,
June 29, 2007, at A4.
100. The same results obtain if we examine majority opinion coalitions. Prior to
Alito's arrival, the mean size of majority coalitions was 6.57; after Alito, the figure is 6.60,
a trivial difference.




5 6 7 8 9 5
Number of Justices
After Alito's Arrival
6 7 a 9
Figure 5: The number of Justices in the majority vote coalition
before and after Alito's arrival. The figure excludes the forty-
nine four-person majority coalitions, all of which were prior to
the 1988 Term.
The cause of this phenomenon deserves further investigation.
For our purposes, suffice it to note that the commentators were not
altogether wrong to place emphasis on the narrow margin of Roberts
Court's decisions. While more than a third were unanimous-
compared with .27 for the period prior to Alito-an unusually large
percentage were five-to-four (34.65 versus 21.64). Thus emerges an
interesting prediction for the current Court's ability to generate
consequential decisions: because on average and controlling for all
other relevant factors the smaller the majority, the higher the
probability of producing important precedent, the dominating five-
person coalitions may bode well (or poorly, depending on one's
perspective).
This much we already are observing. Recall that of the 101
decisions produced by the Roberts Court Justices since Alito's arrival,
eleven register on our indicator of case importance.1 2 Of the eleven,
to reiterate, eight were produced by minimum-winning majorities. To
102. See supra Table 2.
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put it another way, of the thirty-four closely divided decisions, over
twenty-five percent resulted in a consequential decision.
C. Ideological Diversity
Finally we come to the chief explanation of interest, ideological
diversity. We know that prior to Alito's arrival, and holding all other
variables at their mean, moving from maximum levels of homogeneity
to the minimum increases the odds of a consequential decision by
over 200 percent (from .08 to .25). Reestimating the model to include
all cases through the 2006 Term, of course, does not change the
picture, as only 101 of the 5,711 total cases were post-Alito. And
though we are hesitant to reestimate it with only the post-Alito cases
because the number is so small, we can use our data to probe the
relationship.
For starters, as we have noted throughout, the size of the
coalition and its ideological diversity need not be positively related.
Nonetheless, that has typically held for the Supreme Court. In other
words, as we show in Figure 6, smaller majorities tend to be more
homogeneous. Observe that for all but one Term, sizable gaps exist




I i i I i
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Term
- Five in the Majority Nine in the Majority
Figure 6: The relationship between ideological diversity and
the size of the majority vote coalition for two sizes: minimum-
winning (five) and unanimous (unanimous).
Returning to the Roberts Court, note that when its Justices
produce minimum-winning coalitions-as they are (comparatively)
inclined to do-the level of homogeneity also is comparatively high
(1.60 versus 1.50 since O'Connor left). 103 But when the Roberts Court
Justices reach unanimous decisions, as they are also prone to do, the
degree of heterogeneity is, on average, higher than in all previous
eras (2.21 for all previous years; 2.30 for the Roberts Court).
It is from these data that the primary implications for the
Roberts Court's production of consequential precedent become clear.
When this diverse group of Justices is able to agree on the resolution
of a dispute, they are highly unlikely to generate a consequential
103. This difference is not statistically significant. But, as we discuss momentarily in
the text, see also infra note 107, when we compare the relative homogeneity of five-person
coalitions reaching "liberal" decisions, the Roberts Court is significantly more
homogeneous than all other Courts since 1953; but when it reaches conservative decisions,
it is significantly more heterogeneous. The suggestion here is that when Kennedy joins
with the four liberals, the resulting precedent is likely to be more consequential than when
he joins with the four conservatives.
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decision. Reestimating the model to include all the Terms in our
dataset (1953-2006), and setting the variables in accord with a
plausible scenario for the Roberts Court, indicates that fewer than
one out of every ten decisions is likely to produce consequential
precedent.1°4 Such a result, it seems to us, squares nicely with the
Chief Justice's intuition about consensus leading to decisions reached
on the "narrowest possible grounds.""05  Alternatively, given the
slightly higher-than-average homogeneity of the five-person majority
coalitions on the Roberts Court, the continued production of
minimum-winning decisions may lead to highly consequential
precedent: based on a plausible scenario for the Roberts Court,
consequential precedent may result in perhaps as many as one out of
every four decisions.10 6 Interestingly enough, though, it is when
Justice Kennedy joins the four liberals, rather than the four
conservatives, that the Roberts Court is likely to be at its most potent.
This reflects not only the comparative ideology of the two coalitions,
but also their relative homogeneity.1 7  Owing in part to Justice
Thomas's extremism, the left wing (when joined by Justice Kennedy)
is less ideologically diverse than the right (again when joined by
Justice Kennedy)." 8
CONCLUSION
Predictions about the Roberts Court based on two short Terms-
actually one and a half!-abound. And we have now added to the
pile with our suggestion that minimum-winning coalitions on this
Court could produce reasonably consequential precedent.
We do so, though, with eyes wide open. Every existing
forecast-ours not excepted-is necessarily tentative, even uncertain.
104. The predicted probability is .09 [.08, .11].
105. Hope Yen, Roberts Seeks Greater Consensus on Court, WASH. POST,
May 21, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/21/AR2006
052100678pf.html (quoting Justice Roberts's speech to Georgetown University Law
graduates).
106. The predicted probability is .22 [.19, .25].
107. When we set all variables at their means (including ideology), but allow
Ideological Diversity of the Majority to reflect its five-to-four values for the Roberts Court,
the predicted probability of a five-to-four liberal majority on Court producing a
consequential decision is .27 [.23, .30]; that figure for conservative majorities is .23 [.20,
.26]. Of course the gap between those probabilities increases if we also set Ideology of the
Majority to its Roberts Court values (.36 [.31, .41] versus .18 [.14, .21]).
108. See supra note 78.
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Justices drift,"°9 Justices come and go. In our analysis, for example,
were Justices Kennedy and Alito to move to the left, as Justice
O'Connor did in the last few years of her career, our conclusions
would be quite different. Moreover, were the Chief Justice able to
achieve greater consensus-a seemingly quixotic, though nonetheless
pet project of his-the Roberts Court may end up as "modest" as
Professor Dorf suggests.
On the other hand, should our predictions hold, it is Professor
Fallon and Justice Breyer who may have the better case. In light of
the Justices' propensity toward small majority coalitions and the
homogeneity of those coalitions, this Court may turn out to be one on
which "so few... so quickly changed so much.""
APPENDIX: MAJORITY OPINION COALITIONS
In the text, we focus the analysis on majority vote coalitions.
Because a case can be made that it is majority opinion coalitions that
are more relevant to the ideological diversity account, in what follows
we replicate the analyses in Part II for opinion coalitions. As it turns
out, the results are virtually indistinguishable.
A. Statistical Results
In Table 1, we report the estimated coefficients of analysis that
center on the majority vote coalition. Below, in Table 3, we consider
the majority opinion coalition. Note that the estimate of Ideological
Diversity remains statistically significant and correctly signed. Hence,
again and in line with our account, higher degrees of ideological
homogeneity are statistically associated with higher odds of producing
consequential precedent.
109. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal,
Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101
Nw. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007).
110. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Ideological Diversity of the Majority -0.338* (0.073)
Number of Justices in the Majority -0.289* (0.026)
Ideology of the Majority -0.233* (0.042)





Table 3: The effect of the ideological diversity of the
majority opinion coalition on the creation of a
consequential decision. * p < .05. Standard errors are
robust.
B. Substantive Results
In the text, we considered the substantive impact of the statistical
results under a variety of plausible scenarios. We began with the one
most relevant to our analysis, the effect of homogeneity on the
probability of the Court producing salient precedent when we set the
size of the majority vote coalition at five, seven, and nine persons-in
other words, the (approximate) minimum, mean, and maximum
values of Number of Justices in the Majority.11' Figure 7 replicates the
analysis for the majority opinion coalition.
111. See supra Figure 2.
1330 [Vol. 86





1 2 3 4 0 I 2 3 4 0 0 I 2
Ideological Diversity (from Most to Least Homogeneous)
Figure 7: The effect of ideological diversity, for three sizes of
the majority opinion coalition, on the likelihood of producing a
consequential precedent. The panels show the predicted
probability of the Court producing an important decision when
we set the size of the Court's majority at its (approximate)
minimum (five), mean (seven), and maximum (nine) values
over the range of Ideological Diversity (the closer to zero the
more ideologically homogeneous the majority). In all panels,
Ideology of the Majority and Number of Cases are set at their
means. The vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
We generated this figure using SPost.
Just as in the analysis of majority vote coalitions,"' the results
indicate that the more homogeneous the majority, the more likely it is
to produce a consequential decision-regardless of the size of the
opinion coalition. Setting all other variables at their means, a very
heterogeneous majority opinion coalition is quite unlikely to produce
a consequential decision even if it is small (the predicted probability
is .11 [.07, .15]); for five-Justice homogeneous opinion coalitions, the
112. See supra Figure 2.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
W bft
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 Z 3 4 0 1 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
Ideological Diversity (from Most to Least Homogeneous)
Figure 8: The effect of ideological diversity, by the ideology of
the majority opinion coalition, on the likelihood of producing a
consequential precedent. The panels show the predicted
probability of the Court producing an important decision when
we set the ideology of the majority coalition at its most liberal,
moderate (average), and most conservative levels over the
range of Ideological Diversity (the closer to zero the more
ideologically homogeneous the majority). In all panels,
Number of Justices in the Majority and Number of Cases are set
at their means. The vertical lines represent 95% confidence
intervals. We generated this figure using SPost.
113. See supra Figure 3.
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